Prepared by: ZIP Apportionment Initiative (volunteer, outcome-bound)
Proposal in one sentence:
Apportion Maryland’s state legislative representation by ZIP code rather than population,
assigning one delegate per ZIP code, elected by voters residing within that ZIP.
1. The Proposal
Maryland should adopt a geographic, lived-community standard for representation:
Unit: U.S. Postal Service ZIP code
Rule:1 Delegate per ZIP (state House)
Selection: Direct election by voters within each ZIP
Intent: Restore proximity between representatives and the represented by shrinking constituency scale
This proposal treats population variance as a feature rather than a defect: in a republic, the point of representation is
not mathematical equality in theory, but real accountability in practice.
2. The Problem with Population-Based Apportionment
Population-based apportionment predictably drives representation toward a scale mismatch:
as populations concentrate and districts grow, proximity collapses.
This is not a moral claim about any party; it is a structural claim about incentives.
2.1 Scale mismatch
As districts grow, each representative becomes less reachable and less personally accountable.
Local problems are deprioritized because the representative’s rational focus shifts to broad, media-driven issues.
“Representation” becomes periodic mass voting rather than continuous civic contact.
When representation is tied to population totals, boundaries become the battlefield.
Districting turns into a recurring contest for advantage, weakening legitimacy.
Even “independent” maps cannot remove the incentive to manipulate lines; they can only relocate who draws them.
2.3 Factions consolidate
Larger districts increase the value of money, endorsements, and institutional pipelines.
Political outcomes concentrate around organized interests that can reliably mobilize at scale.
Ordinary voters experience politics as distant, pre-decided, and unresponsive.
In short: population apportionment tends to produce representatives who are formally legitimate but
practically remote.
3. Why ZIP Codes Work as a Representation Unit
ZIP codes are not perfect. That is precisely the point: representation is a human system, not a geometry problem.
ZIP codes are nevertheless a strong unit because they are real, lived, and
hard to game for political advantage.
3.1 Lived geography
Most people can name their ZIP and recognize it as “their area.”
ZIPs correlate with daily life: mail, schools, commuting patterns, local commerce, and shared services.
3.2 Cultural and community coherence
ZIPs often reflect neighborhoods, towns, and recognizable communities of interest.
They can capture distinct subcultures and local priorities that get washed out in large multi-community districts.
3.3 Non-gerrymanderable in the usual way
ZIP boundaries are not drawn by state legislators for electoral advantage.
They can change over time, but changes are not primarily driven by partisan mapmaking incentives.
Design claim:
A representation unit is “good” if it reduces the ability of political actors to pick their voters and increases
the ability of voters to know (and pressure) their representative.
4. Anticipated Objections (and Direct Answers)
Objection A: “But ZIP codes weren’t designed for representation.”
Correct. They were designed for logistics. That’s a benefit: it reduces partisan incentives to manipulate them.
Representation units do not need to be “designed for politics” to serve political accountability.
They need to be stable enough to use and real enough to live in.
Objection B: “Population equality is democratic.”
Population equality is one value among several. In practice, extreme scale weakens accountability.
This proposal prioritizes proximity, diffusion of power, and resistance to capture
over abstract equality that cannot be operationalized into meaningful consent.
Objection C: “Won’t this change the composition of the legislature?”
It will change incentives. That is the purpose. A system should not be preserved because it produces a preferred
composition; it should be judged by whether it reliably produces responsive representation.
Objection D: “ZIPs change.”
They do, gradually. Any workable model can set a simple update rule (for example, using a fixed reference date each cycle).
Change is manageable; the deeper problem is political boundary manipulation. The point is to remove the map from the hands
of the political class.
5. Constitutional and Practical Plausibility
This brief does not offer legal advice. It makes a plain institutional point:
states have broad authority to design their internal legislative structures, and history shows wide variance across
state constitutional arrangements.
Maryland can define representation units through constitutional and statutory design.
The proposal is administratively feasible: ZIP boundaries are documented and publicly known.
Election administration is straightforward: a voter’s residence determines their ZIP-based constituency.
6. What “Success” Looks Like
This initiative is outcome-bound. The immediate purpose of this brief is not fundraising, branding, or organizational growth.
Success is measured in institutional movement:
Formal introduction of a ZIP-apportionment bill or constitutional amendment language
Establishment of a legislative study commission or formal hearing
Public, on-record engagement by Maryland officials addressing the proposal on the merits
Closing claim:
If representation exists to secure consent, then proximity matters. Where proximity collapses, legitimacy becomes thin.
ZIP-based apportionment is a concrete way to restore a human scale to self-government.