           __________________________________________________

            ZIP APPORTIONMENT VS. INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING
                  COMMISSIONS VS. RANKED-CHOICE VOTING

                              Norman Bauer
           __________________________________________________


Table of Contents
_________________

1. ZIP Apportionment vs. Independent Redistricting Commissions vs. Ranked-Choice Voting
.. 1. What Is Being Reformed?
.. 2. Independent Redistricting Commissions: Moving the Mapmakers
.. 3. Ranked-Choice Voting: Changing the Ballot
.. 4. ZIP Apportionment: Changing the Geographic Foundation
.. 5. ZIP Codes Require a Precise Legal Definition
.. 6. What ZIP Apportionment Would Improve
.. 7. What ZIP Apportionment Would Not Automatically Solve
.. 8. The Central Difference
.. 9. Which One Confronts Gerrymandering?
.. 10. A Question of Discretion
.. 11. Improving the Existing System or Rebuilding Its Foundation





1 ZIP Apportionment vs. Independent Redistricting Commissions vs. Ranked-Choice Voting
======================================================================================

  - *Norman Bauer*
  - ZIP Apportionment Initiative
  - [https://zipinit.org]
  - [expand@zipinit.org]

  When Americans discuss reforming elections, two proposals tend to
  dominate the conversation: independent redistricting commissions and
  ranked-choice voting.

  Independent commissions are presented as a way to reduce partisan
  control over district maps. Ranked-choice voting is presented as a way
  to give voters more choices and allow preferences beyond a single
  candidate to influence the result.

  Both may improve parts of the existing electoral system. Neither
  changes its underlying geographic foundation.

  ZIP apportionment is a newer and far less familiar proposal. Rather
  than asking only who should draw legislative districts or how votes
  should be counted within them, it begins with a more fundamental
  question:

        *Why should politicians or appointed commissions construct
         representational boundaries when established geographic
         communities could instead serve as the basis of
         representation?*

  That is the central difference.

  Independent redistricting commissions change *who draws electoral
  districts*.

  Ranked-choice voting changes *how voters select among candidates and
  how those votes are counted*.

  ZIP apportionment changes *the geographic foundation upon which
  representation is organized*.

  This is therefore not a comparison among three interchangeable
  reforms. It is a comparison between two widely discussed attempts to
  improve the existing system and a less familiar proposal that would
  restructure the system closer to its foundation.


[https://zipinit.org] <https://zipinit.org>

[expand@zipinit.org] <mailto:expand@zipinit.org>

1.1 What Is Being Reformed?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  The traditional American system begins with a predetermined number of
  legislative seats. After each decennial census, the population is
  divided among districts from which representatives are elected.

  That process raises several separate questions:

  - How many representatives will there be?
  - What geographic communities will they represent?
  - Who will draw the boundaries?
  - How will voters choose among the candidates?

  Independent redistricting commissions primarily address the question
  of who draws the boundaries.

  Ranked-choice voting addresses how voters choose among candidates and
  how the winner is determined.

  ZIP apportionment begins with the question of what geographic
  communities representatives should represent. By answering that
  question first, it could also restrict how much power any mapmaker has
  to manipulate the boundaries afterward.


1.2 Independent Redistricting Commissions: Moving the Mapmakers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  Independent redistricting commissions are commonly described as a way
  to remove partisan politics from redistricting.

  That description deserves scrutiny.

  An independent commission may be independent of the legislature’s
  direct control without being independent of political parties,
  political appointments or ideological influence. The word
  /independent/ describes the commission’s institutional position. It
  does not necessarily mean that its members are politically neutral.

  Commission structures vary considerably. Some include
  legislators. Some reserve positions for members of the major political
  parties. Others employ screening committees, applicant pools and
  appointments made by elected political leaders.

  The result may be a body that is bipartisan rather than nonpartisan.

  That distinction matters.

  A bipartisan commission does not remove partisan interests from
  redistricting. It places representatives of those interests together
  on a separate body and asks them to negotiate the map.


1.2.1 Virginia’s bipartisan commission
--------------------------------------

  Virginia’s redistricting commission provides a particularly clear
  example.

  The commission consisted of 16 members: eight legislators and eight
  citizens. The legislative seats were divided between members of the
  two largest parties in the Virginia Senate and House of Delegates and
  filled by the respective legislative leaders.[1]

  The citizen commissioners were not selected in a statewide
  election. Legislative leaders submitted lists of proposed citizen
  members to a selection committee composed of retired judges, which
  then chose the eight citizen commissioners.[2]

  During a June 2021 meeting, citizen commissioner Richard Harrell
  directly addressed the distinction between independence and
  nonpartisanship. The official meeting summary records that Harrell
  described the commission as “not nonpartisan but rather bipartisan”
  and observed that its members had been selected on a partisan
  basis.[3]

  That characterization did not come from an outside opponent of
  commissions. It came from a member of the commission during its own
  proceedings.

  Virginia’s system may have prevented one legislative majority from
  exercising unilateral control over every district. But it did not
  remove partisanship from mapmaking. It created a body in which
  partisan representatives and politically selected citizens shared the
  authority.


1.2.2 Arizona’s partisan structure
----------------------------------

  Arizona uses a different model, but political affiliation remains
  built into its structure.

  The Arizona Constitution creates a five-member independent
  redistricting commission. Legislative leaders appoint four
  commissioners from a screened pool. No more than two of those four may
  belong to the same political party. The four appointed commissioners
  then select a fifth member, who serves as chair and cannot be
  registered with a party already represented on the commission.[4]

  The selection pool itself is divided according to political
  registration: nominees from each of the state’s two largest parties
  and nominees who are not registered with either of those parties.[5]

  This arrangement may prevent either major party from automatically
  controlling a majority. That is different from removing partisan
  considerations from the process.

  Four of the five appointments are made by elected legislative leaders,
  and the constitutional structure explicitly accounts for party
  affiliation.


1.2.3 The accountability problem
--------------------------------

  Redistricting performed by a legislature is openly political.

  The legislators who vote for a map are elected officials. Their names,
  party affiliations and votes can be made public. Voters may oppose
  them in a subsequent election.

  Commissioners generally do not face that same form of direct electoral
  accountability.

  They exercise substantial power over representation, but voters
  ordinarily cannot remove an individual commissioner at the next
  election. Accountability instead depends on the appointment system,
  public-meeting requirements, disclosure rules, judicial review and
  whatever removal procedures the state has established.

  Supporters may regard this insulation from electoral pressure as a
  virtue. Commissioners who are not running for office may be less
  concerned about protecting their own districts.

  Critics can reasonably view the same insulation as a defect. Political
  power has been transferred from elected partisans to appointed people
  who may themselves have strong partisan or ideological commitments but
  who cannot be removed directly by voters.


1.2.4 The appointment problem
-----------------------------

  Calling a commission independent does not make its selection process
  open or politically neutral.

  Political leaders may control appointments. Screening bodies may
  determine who is eligible. Party registration may determine which
  seats applicants can fill. Rules intended to exclude political
  insiders may also create a specialized applicant class that is
  unfamiliar to ordinary voters.

  The decisive questions are therefore not merely whether commissioners
  currently hold elected office.

  - Who nominated them?
  - Who screened them?
  - Who appointed them?
  - Were seats distributed according to party affiliation?
  - What political or professional relationships did the commissioners
    have before their appointment?
  - What direct recourse do voters have if they believe a commissioner
    abused the position?

  A commission can move mapmaking one step away from the legislature
  while remaining deeply connected to the political establishment.


1.2.5 What commissions may improve
----------------------------------

  A commission can prevent the majority party in a legislature from
  exercising complete and unilateral control over redistricting.

  It may require agreement across party lines. It may conduct public
  hearings, publish proposed maps and receive public submissions. It may
  also prevent sitting legislators from personally designing districts
  to protect their own seats.

  Those are genuine possible improvements over unrestricted legislative
  mapmaking.

  But they should not be confused with political neutrality.

  A map negotiated by appointed Democrats, appointed Republicans and
  politically screened independents remains a map constructed through a
  political process.


1.2.6 What commissions leave unchanged
--------------------------------------

  Most importantly, the commission still possesses the power to
  construct constituencies.

  Its members decide which communities remain together, which are
  divided and where each district begins and ends. They must balance
  population equality, political boundaries, compactness, communities of
  interest and voting-rights requirements.

  Those considerations can conflict. Applying them requires judgment.

  Replacing legislators with commissioners therefore does not eliminate
  the central power that makes gerrymandering possible. It transfers
  that power to another body.

  The public is then asked to trust that the new mapmakers are fairer,
  less self-interested or more restrained than the old ones.

  Sometimes they may be.

  But the institutional problem remains: a small group of people still
  has the authority to decide which voters will be placed together and
  which will be separated.

  ZIP apportionment takes a different approach. It does not depend
  primarily upon finding better people to draw political boundaries. It
  attempts to reduce how much freedom anyone has to draw them.


1.3 Ranked-Choice Voting: Changing the Ballot
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  Ranked-choice voting operates at a later stage of the electoral
  process.

  Under the familiar single-winner form, voters rank candidates in order
  of preference rather than selecting only one. When no candidate
  receives the required number of first-choice votes, the candidate with
  the fewest votes is eliminated. Ballots assigned to that candidate are
  transferred to the next-ranked candidate who remains in the
  contest. Counting continues in rounds until a winner is determined.[6]

  Ranked-choice voting therefore changes the information voters may
  place on the ballot and the process used to determine the winner.

  It does not determine where district boundaries are located.

  A state could use ranked-choice voting within districts drawn by a
  legislature. It could use it within districts drawn by a
  commission. It could also use it within constituencies based on ZIP
  geography.


1.3.1 What ranked-choice voting may improve
-------------------------------------------

  Ranked-choice voting allows voters to express more information than a
  traditional single-choice ballot.

  A voter may support a preferred candidate while also identifying a
  second or third choice. In a race with several candidates, this can
  reduce the concern that voting for a less-established candidate will
  help elect the voter’s least-preferred candidate.

  Depending upon the form adopted, RCV can also produce a majority
  winner through additional counting rounds without requiring a separate
  runoff election.

  Those are changes to the manner in which candidates compete and voters
  express their preferences.


1.3.2 What ranked-choice voting leaves unchanged
------------------------------------------------

  Ranked-choice voting does not prevent gerrymandering.

  A district can still be designed to concentrate one group of voters in
  a small number of districts or divide that group among several
  districts. Giving those voters a ranked ballot does not alter the
  geographic composition of their constituency.

  RCV also does not determine how many representatives a community
  receives. In a single-member system, the district still elects one
  representative regardless of whether voters select one candidate or
  rank several.

  Ranked-choice voting changes the election held inside a constituency.

  It does not change how that constituency was created.


1.4 ZIP Apportionment: Changing the Geographic Foundation
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  ZIP apportionment begins earlier in the process.

  Instead of beginning with a fixed number of seats and directing
  mapmakers to divide a state into that many districts, it begins with
  established ZIP-based communities.

  Under the proposal considered here, residential five-digit ZIP areas
  would provide the initial geographic units of representation. A ZIP
  area within an established population range could elect one
  representative. A more populous ZIP could receive additional
  representatives and, where necessary, be divided into smaller
  constituencies under predetermined rules.

  The objective is not simply to appoint more trustworthy mapmakers.

  It is to reduce the mapmaker’s authority by establishing the basic
  representational geography before anyone considers the likely partisan
  result.

  Traditional redistricting begins with the number of districts and
  constructs the geography needed to fill them.

  ZIP apportionment begins with the geography and derives much of the
  representation from it.

  That reverses the order of the process.


1.5 ZIP Codes Require a Precise Legal Definition
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  ZIP Codes were created for mail delivery, not political
  representation.

  They also are not geographic polygons in the same sense as counties,
  municipalities or legislative districts. The Census Bureau explains
  that postal ZIP Codes are collections of delivery routes and points
  rather than conventional areas.[7]

  To publish demographic and geographic data associated with ZIP Codes,
  the Census Bureau creates ZIP Code Tabulation Areas, or ZCTAs. ZCTAs
  are generalized area representations constructed from census blocks to
  approximate the geographic distribution of ZIP Code service areas.[8]

  A ZCTA is not identical to a postal ZIP Code.

  Not every postal ZIP Code corresponds to a conventional residential
  area. Some ZIP Codes principally serve post-office boxes,
  organizations or particular delivery functions. Census geography also
  shows that ZCTAs need not remain entirely within county, municipal or
  even state boundaries.[9]

  Any serious ZIP-apportionment law must therefore define exactly which
  geography governs.

  It cannot merely say, “Use ZIP Codes.”

  The law would need to identify the official geographic dataset,
  determine how often it is updated and establish rules for
  discrepancies between postal ZIP assignments and census geography.

  These are genuine implementation questions. They are not reasons to
  dismiss the proposal, but they must be answered before ZIP
  apportionment could become a functioning legal system.


1.6 What ZIP Apportionment Would Improve
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  ZIP apportionment is intended to reduce the freedom to construct
  constituencies for political purposes.

  Under conventional redistricting, mapmakers can combine census blocks,
  precincts, neighborhoods and portions of communities until a district
  reaches its required population. Even when rules discourage
  unnecessary division, the final district remains the product of human
  decisions.

  A ZIP-based system would begin with geographic units that already
  exist independently of the redistricting process.

  The ZIP would not have been created because it produces a desirable
  Republican, Democratic or incumbent-protecting result. It would
  predate the election and would have been established for an unrelated
  administrative purpose.

  That does not mean every postal ZIP is naturally a unified political
  community. ZIP areas can cross other jurisdictional boundaries and can
  contain residents who do not regard themselves as belonging to the
  same civic community.

  The narrower and more defensible claim is that ZIP geography provides
  an existing, externally established starting point that political
  mapmakers did not create for the election before them.

  That would change where discretion enters the system.

  Instead of giving mapmakers broad authority to design every
  constituency, ZIP apportionment would require them to justify
  departures from a predefined geographic rule.


1.7 What ZIP Apportionment Would Not Automatically Solve
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  ZIP populations vary substantially. A strict rule granting exactly one
  representative to every ZIP area, regardless of population, would
  create major population disparities.

  The Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote cases require state and local
  legislative districts to be constructed on a substantially
  equal-population basis. The Court has stated that when members of an
  elected body are chosen from separate districts, those districts must,
  as far as practicable, allow equal numbers of people to elect
  proportionally equal numbers of representatives.[10]

  A workable ZIP model would therefore require a population threshold.

  A smaller residential ZIP might elect one representative. A much
  larger ZIP might elect several representatives or be divided into
  several internal constituencies.

  That creates another risk.

  If officials are given broad discretion to subdivide large ZIP areas
  or combine small ones, the system could recreate conventional
  redistricting under another name.

  For ZIP apportionment to serve its intended purpose, those exceptions
  would have to be narrow, transparent and governed by rules established
  before the partisan effects of a particular map were known.

  A ZIP-based system would also have to comply with the Voting Rights
  Act. Section 2 applies nationwide to voting standards, practices and
  procedures, including districting plans and methods used to elect
  public officials. It prohibits both intentionally discriminatory
  practices and practices that produce prohibited discriminatory
  results.[11]

  ZIP boundaries could not be treated as an excuse to ignore those
  requirements.

  The proposal must therefore solve two problems at once:

  - It must preserve enough population equality and voting-rights
    protection to meet existing law.
  - It must also restrict political discretion enough that ZIP geography
    does not become merely another set of pieces for mapmakers to
    rearrange.


1.8 The Central Difference
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  The most useful comparison is not simply which proposal is best. It is
  which institutional question each proposal answers.

   Approach                               Central question                                               What it changes                                                                               What remains                                                                                                        
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Independent redistricting commissions  Who draws the districts?                                       Mapping authority moves from elected legislators to an appointed or separately selected body  Custom districts, population balancing, partisan influence and subjective boundary decisions remain                 
   Ranked-choice voting                   How is the winner selected?                                    Voters rank candidates and ballots may be transferred through counting rounds                 District geography and the number of representatives generally remain unchanged                                     
   ZIP apportionment                      What geographic communities should representation begin with?  ZIP-based geography becomes the default foundation for allocating representation              Population equality, voting-rights compliance and limited rules for unusually large or small areas remain necessary 

  These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

  A ZIP-apportioned legislature could use ranked-choice voting. A
  commission could be assigned the limited task of subdividing ZIP areas
  that exceed an established population threshold. Ranked-choice voting
  could be adopted without changing any district boundaries.

  They can coexist because they operate at different layers of the
  electoral system.

  But they should not be treated as equally fundamental.

  Ranked-choice voting modifies the election conducted within a
  constituency.

  An independent commission modifies the institution authorized to draw
  the constituency.

  ZIP apportionment establishes a different starting point for
  determining what the constituency is.


1.9 Which One Confronts Gerrymandering?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  The answer depends upon how deeply we define the problem.

  If gerrymandering is understood primarily as legislators drawing maps
  for their own partisan advantage, an independent commission addresses
  the immediate conflict of interest.

  It changes who holds the pencil.

  But partisan gerrymandering is accomplished through the strategic
  placement of district lines. The Supreme Court has described it as
  drawing legislative districts to subordinate one political party’s
  supporters and entrench a rival party in power.[12]

  If the deeper problem is that any political institution possesses
  broad authority to assemble voters into strategically useful
  constituencies, ZIP apportionment goes further.

  It limits what the pencil may draw.

  Ranked-choice voting may improve competition and voter choice within a
  district, but it does not change the district’s boundaries. It
  therefore does not directly remove the geographic mechanism through
  which gerrymandering occurs.

  This does not mean commissions or ranked-choice voting have no value.

  It means they work within the familiar districting structure.

  ZIP apportionment challenges that structure.


1.10 A Question of Discretion
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  The three approaches can also be understood by asking where they place
  political discretion.

  Independent redistricting commissions transfer mapping discretion to a
  separate body, often structured to balance partisan interests rather
  than eliminate them.

  Ranked-choice voting gives voters greater discretion to express
  preferences among several candidates.

  ZIP apportionment attempts to reduce the discretion available to
  anyone constructing geographic constituencies.

  Each approach involves tradeoffs.

  A commission can consider local conditions and balance competing
  criteria, but doing so requires subjective judgment.

  Ranked-choice voting allows voters to express additional preferences,
  but it requires compatible ballot design, counting procedures,
  election systems and voter education. The U.S. Election Assistance
  Commission recognizes that alternative voting methods create distinct
  administrative and implementation considerations for election
  officials.[13]

  ZIP apportionment provides a more rule-bound geographic starting
  point, but ZIP areas were not created as political units and vary
  greatly in population and configuration.

  The relevant question is not whether one approach is flawless.

  None is.

  The relevant question is which form of discretion poses the greatest
  threat to representational integrity and where that discretion should
  reside.


1.11 Improving the Existing System or Rebuilding Its Foundation
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

  Independent redistricting commissions and ranked-choice voting are
  widely discussed because they offer changes without requiring a
  complete reconsideration of how representation is geographically
  organized.

  A commission promises a different mapmaker.

  Ranked-choice voting promises a more expressive ballot.

  ZIP apportionment makes a larger claim: the problem may not be limited
  to who draws the map or how elections are conducted after the map is
  complete.

  The deeper problem may be the assumption that representation should
  begin with a map constructed by political authorities.

  That is what makes ZIP apportionment different.

  It begins with existing communities rather than a desired number of
  districts.

  It treats geographic boundaries as something political officials
  should inherit whenever practicable, not something they should be free
  to invent.

  It does not promise to eliminate every dispute. Large ZIP areas would
  still need to be divided. Population equality would still
  matter. Voting-rights protections would still apply. Rules would be
  needed for changes in census and postal geography.

  But those decisions would occur within a system whose default
  boundaries had been established for reasons unrelated to the election.

  Independent commissions attempt to improve or balance the people who
  draw the lines.

  Ranked-choice voting improves the choices voters make inside those
  lines.

  ZIP apportionment asks whether we can remove much of the power to draw
  those lines in the first place.

  That is not simply another election reform.

  It is a different foundation for representation.



Footnotes
_________

[1] Code of Virginia § 30-392 establishes a 16-member commission
composed of eight legislative commissioners and eight citizen
commissioners. The legislative members are appointed by the leaders of
the two largest parties in each chamber. [Source]
(<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title30/chapter62/section30-392/>)

[2] Code of Virginia §§ 30-393 and 30-394 establish the Redistricting
Commission Selection Committee and the process under which legislative
leaders submit citizen candidates for selection. [Source]
(<https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacodefull/title30/chapter62/>)

[3] Virginia Redistricting Commission, /Summary of Meeting/, June 7,
2021, p. 2. The official summary states that Richard Harrell described
the commission as “not nonpartisan but rather bipartisan” and said its
members had been selected on a partisan basis. [Source]
(<https://www.virginiaredistricting.org/2021/Data/public%20hearings/sm060721.pdf>)

[4] Arizona Constitution, Article IV, Part 2, § 1, establishes the
five-member Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission and its
appointment process. [Source]
(<https://www.azleg.gov/const/4/1.p2.htm>)

[5] The Arizona Constitution requires the applicant pool to contain
nominees from each of the two largest political parties and nominees
not registered with either of those parties. [Source]
(<https://www.azleg.gov/const/4/1.p2.htm>)

[6] U.S. Election Assistance Commission, /Alternative Voting Methods
in the United States/, describing ranked ballots and successive-round
tabulation methods. [Source]
(<https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/alternative-voting-methods-united-states>)

[7] U.S. Census Bureau, “2011 Geography Changes,” explaining that ZIP
Codes are collections of postal delivery routes rather than geographic
areas. [Source]
(<https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-documentation/table-and-geography-changes/2011/geography-changes.html>)

[8] U.S. Census Bureau, “ZIP Code Tabulation Areas,” defining ZCTAs as
generalized area representations of point-based ZIP Codes constructed
from census blocks. [Source]
(<https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/zctas.html>)

[9] U.S. Census Bureau materials explain that ZCTAs are approximate
representations of postal service areas and may cross county, place
and, in a small number of cases, state boundaries. [Source]
(<https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/about/glossary.html>)

[10] The Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote doctrine requires
separately elected districts to provide substantially equal
representation. See /Reynolds v. Sims/, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and the
Court’s summary of the doctrine in /Evenwel v. Abbott/. [Source]
(<https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/14-00940qp.pdf>)

[11] U.S. Department of Justice, /Guidance Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act/, explaining that Section 2 applies nationwide to
districting plans and methods of electing public officials and
prohibits both intentionally discriminatory practices and practices
producing discriminatory results. [Source]
(<https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/1429826/dl?inline=>)

[12] In /Rucho v. Common Cause/, the Supreme Court discussed partisan
gerrymandering claims involving district lines drawn to subordinate
one political party’s supporters and entrench another party in
power. [Source]
(<https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf>)

[13] U.S. Election Assistance Commission, /Alternative Voting Methods
in the United States/. [Source]
(<https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/alternative-voting-methods-united-states>)
